ZESCO, CEC COMMENCE NEGOTIATIONS FOR NEW POWER SUPPLY AGREEMENT

ZESCO Limited and Copperbelt Energy Corporation Plc (CEC) say they have commenced negotiations for new arrangements for power supply and provision of transmission services between the power networks. In a joint statement, Wednesday, ZESCO Managing Director Victor Mapani and his counterpart Owen Silavwe said the negotiations, which commenced during the week starting January 17, 2022, were expected to culminate into a new agreement to replace the bulk supply agreement which expired on March 31, 2020. They agreed that the strong interconnection which exists between the power networks, coupled with the……

 

Source: https://diggers.news/business/2022/01/20/zesco-cec-commence-negotiations-for-new-power-supply-agreement/

CEC STRONGLY REFUTES CLAIMS MADE BY DR. MBITA CHITALA

CEC is deeply concerned by the claims made by Dr. Mbita Chitala, the immediate past Board Chairman of ZESCO Limited (ZESCO), in his recently released book, ‘Corporate Capture: The Political Economy of Electricity Management in Zambia (How Not to Manage a State Enterprise)’. The integrity of the book, which is purported to contain information inter alia suggestive of a CEC scheme in the alleged corporate capture of ZESCO, is questionable and the claims made against CEC meritless. It is extremely disappointing that Dr. Chitala chose to make such serious and unsubstantiated claims against a company bound by strict disclosure obligations as a listed entity, whose information can easily be verified. As one of the leading listed companies on the Lusaka Securities Exchange (LuSE), CEC adheres to strong corporate governance principles and conduct and has clear, transparent and honest communication and disclosures.

Whatever Dr. Chitala’s motives, it is clear that he makes several contradictions, misstatements, omissions of fact and repositioning of narratives to lead the reader to a particular conclusion. Dr. Chitala openly acknowledges various schemes, including the establishment of a new Special Purpose Vehicle, which were considered to take over CEC while he was Chairman of ZESCO. He provides two detailed options which he sketches out in the book. This could explain his motivation to undermine CEC so as to bring its value down and possibly take over the Company on the cheap.

We are continuing to study the book systematically and are still seeking legal guidance on some of the allegations and inaccurate statements. However, in the interest of transparency, we would like to highlight a few of the allegations and inaccurate statements:

  • Throughout the book, Dr. Chitala tries to build the narrative that CEC’s shareholding is dominated by foreign interests. In Table 60, he presents a “CEC shareholding at becoming public” which is completely fabricated. Two shareholder groups in the table which he credits with a combined 45.1% shareholding in the Company were not even shareholders of the Company at the time. ZCCM- IH and ZECI, two entities representing Zambians, held over 72% of the shares which is not captured therein. In Table 61, he again continues with the misrepresentation showing shareholding in 2018 with ZCCM-IH at 13.25% instead of 20%. CEC is a listed company on the LuSE and, therefore, its shareholding is a matter of public record and easily verifiable by anyone. It is surprising that Dr. Chitala, whose biography at the beginning of the book refers to him as, “a registered Finance and Investment Adviser with the Zambian Securities and Exchange Commission” couldn’t verify this basic information which he relies on to make a key argument in his book.
  • An allegation he makes consistently is that CEC disadvantages ZESCO by paying a suboptimal tariff. Dr. Chitala contradicts himself with regard to what the actual tariff CEC pays ZESCO. On page xvii, he states, “[ZESCO sold] to the mines through CEC at an average tariff of US$c 6.33/kWh. This was simply poor business.” Yet on page 114, he states, “Under the BSA, CEC obtained power from ZESCO at an average tariff of US$c 8.11/kWh.” If the Chairman of ZESCO for 5 years is not clear what their largest customer buys power at, why should we expect any different from those he reported to? No wonder Mr. Ronald Chitotela recently argued in Parliament that under the BSA, ZESCO sold power to CEC at US$c 3/kWh.
  • CEC – Mopani Tariff Negotiations of 2017. Dr. Chitala on page 148 writes: “Until I left ZESCO, CEC had not concluded its tariff discussions with Mopani and failed to provide any progress to ZESCO or government.” This is, again, another blatant lie by Dr. Chitala. The truth is that CEC and Mopani completed these negotiations within 2017 and signed an addendum to their Power Supply Agreement (PSA) reflecting the agreed changes in tariff. It is again difficult to understand the motive behind blatant lies as presented on this subject by Dr. Chitala. Following the signing of the addendum between CEC and Mopani, CEC proceeded to inform both ZESCO and the Government and proposed a draft addendum to the BSA to ZESCO. However, under the leadership of Dr. Chitala, ZESCO was unwilling to review the addendum from CEC nor to sign it.
  • Dr. Chitala makes a claim that the BSA through Clause (b) (i) and (ii) gave exclusivity of supply to CEC on the Copperbelt to the detriment of ZESCO and its business. In similar fashion as all the other points that Dr. Chitala raises as issues that ZESCO had with the BSA, what has been presented in the book is, unfortunately, nothing but misrepresentations and half-truths. However, for brevity, we will only cover the issue dealing with exclusivity of supply because of its alleged business implications on ZESCO. On page 97, he writes: “Clauses 10 (b) (i) and (ii) gave Exclusivity of Supply by CEC to the Copperbelt and was bad as it was discriminatory and violated all laws of commence. By this clause CEC was granted an ‘exclusive franchise’ for the supply of power on the Copperbelt. This entailed that only CEC could supply all mining and mining related activities. This exclusively was very restrictive and provided a monopoly to CEC with regard to supply of power to the mining customers on the Copperbelt, a position not commercially viable. Further, the said clause prohibited ZESCO from constructing, owning or operating transmission and distribution lines in these MineCo sites. The net effect of the foregoing was that ZESCO became restricted in owning or expanding its network on the Copperbelt. Section 8 of the Competition and Consumer Protection (CPC) Act, prohibited Parties from entering into Agreements that restrict competition.” However, Dr. Chitala completely omits an important aspect of the BSA contained in Clause 1 (a) (iii) which prohibited CEC from purchasing the power it supplied to its mining customers from any other source but ZESCO, unless in situations where ZESCO had no capacity to supply CEC’s power requirements. The BSA, therefore, exclusively reserved the Copperbelt mining market for ZESCO’s power and, thus, solidly protected ZESCO’s business interest in this respect. It was always clear that under the BSA, CEC could not and did not buy power from any other company but ZESCO.
  • Dr. Chitala makes various claims of CEC owing ZESCO an amount ranging from US$225 – 325 million. On page xxix, he pegs CEC’s alleged owing to ZESCO at US$325 million and on page 120, when discussing his proposal for ZESCO to acquire CEC, he states, “ZESCO would have to pay a cash price of US$288 million. However, ZESCO also noted that CEC owed ZESCO about US$257.1 million and that this amount would be used to offset the price for the purchase of any ordinary shares from CEC.” However, Dr. Chitala goes on to contradict himself on page 124 by stating that the purported money that CEC owes ZESCO is the subject of Judicial Review proceedings in a case brought by the Chamber of Mines against the Energy Regulation Board (ERB) in 2014. Dr. Chitala states, “If the ERB decision is determined to be lawful by the Zambian High Court, ZESCO would be entitled to claim US$ 225 million from CEC.” Worth noting is that CEC would also be entitled to claim a similar amount from the mines in such a case. Further, Dr. Chitala omits to state that the decision of the ERB, while being the subject of the ongoing judicial review, has also been stayed by the High Court.
  • Dr. Chitala misrepresents a number of the court cases involving the companies.
    1. Common Carrier Proceedings (Statutory Instrument 57 of 2020) – this is a matter in which CEC commenced judicial review proceedings against the then Minister of Energy’s decision to declare CEC’s transmission and distribution lines as common carrier on 29 May 2020.Dr. Chitala selectively does not take the reader through to the final outcome but rather chooses to end with the following, “The court of appeal refused to grant CEC an order of stay of execution of the Minister’s statutory directive. This meant that ZESCO would be enabled to use CEC’s assets to supply KCM and other mining companies on the Copperbelt who so wished at a tariff set by the ERB and the CEC action appeared to be academic actions with no legal import.”

      The real final outcome is that High Court Judge Elita Phiri Mwikisa found that the applicant (CEC) succeeded on all grounds and accordingly quashed the decision of the Minister of Energy to declare its transmission and distribution lines as common carrier (SI 57). In a 71 page judgement, Judge Mwikisa stated, “whereas the Applicants concede that the minister does have power under section 15 (1) to declare a transmission line as a common carrier, they argue that he does not have power to declare the entire interconnected power system as common carrier and that he acted in excess of his powers. The Applicants contend that this action by the minister amounts to expropriation. I tend to agree with the submissions of the Applicants to the extent that the Minister’s decision was ultra vires as he acted in excess of his powers,”

    2. ZESCO and KCM Injunction – this is a matter in which ZESCO and KCM were granted an ex-parte injunction against CEC which stopped CEC from interfering with the supply of power by ZESCO to KCM following the expiry of the PSA between CEC and KCM. CEC counterclaimed, accusing ZESCO and KCM of colluding, which led to CEC not being paid US$144 million relating to unpaid invoices for power CEC had supplied to KCM under their PSA.Again, Dr. Chitala selectively does not take the reader through to the final outcome but rather chooses to end with the following, “ZESCO considered the CEC action as groundless, not least since ZESCO had not been privy to that PSA and was itself free as the Electricity Act 2019 provided to compete for business.”

      The final outcome is that the matter came up for a status conference in August 2021 at which both ZESCO and KCM informed the court that they were discontinuing their actions following the quashing of SI 57 of 2020 by the High Court upon which they had grounded their respective claims. ZESCO finally filed its notice discontinuing the action.

We are deeply concerned with the way Dr. Chitala’s book is positioned and with its depiction of CEC. Our Board is discussing any additional action the Company could take, about which our stakeholders will be informed accordingly. CEC remains committed to transparency and full disclosure.

The Company reassures all its stakeholders that it is engaging constructively with the new Board and Management team at ZESCO, the Ministry of Energy and the ERB with the key objective of advancing the interest of the sector in a fair and equitable manner.

For more information, contact:

Chama Nsabika
Senior Manager Corporate Communication
+260 212 244914
+260 966 792922
nsabika@cec.com.zm

Source: https://cecinvestor.com/cec-strongly-refutes-claims-made-by-dr-mbita-chitala/

ZAMBIA HAS MORE THAN COPPER, AND OFFERS UNEXPLORED POTENTIAL

With billions of dollars worth of African gas, gold, copper and cobalt to hit the markets in 2022, industry players are focused on the next big deals. The election of a new government in Zambia in August 2021 has led to optimism that the country is the stand-out player in African minerals exploration for 2022.

“All eyes are on Zambia,” says Peter Major, director of mining at Mergence Corporate Solutions in South Africa. Major spoke in Cape Town in October as he prepared for a mining investment trip to Zambia. In the new president, Hakainde Hichilema, he says, the country has “a real businessman” in charge.

As well as copper, whose industrial mining in Zambia dates back to the 1930s, the country has significant potential in gold, manganese, emeralds and coal, Major says. There has been a historic lack of exploration since the post-independence nationalisation of the mines, he says. Over the past five years, in particular, there has been “no motivation to prospect”.

A working cadastral system gives Zambia a crucial advantage over Ghana and the Democratic Republic of Congo, Major points out. But the question mark over the Hichilema administration is how it will handle its review of existing mining licences. “We need to see some people coming out of the other side of the pipeline,” Major says. Once that starts happening, he predicts, there will be a “stampede” to explore and mine in Zambia.

According to Irmgard Erasmus, a senior financial economist at Oxford Economics in Cape Town, Hichilema and his minister of mines, Paul Kabuswe, are likely to take a “more pragmatic, market-orientated approach” in dealing with mining companies, in contrast to the “hard-handed and interventionist stance” under the former president, Edgar Lungu. The Zambia Chamber of Mines has welcomed plans to reform the tax code, saying this will mark a break from the old “cash-grab mentality”.

Strike while the copper is hot

Mining was the only sector of the Zambian economy to decline in the second quarter of 2021, when copper production dropped 9%, hurt by the impact of Covid-19 and the first-quarter rainy season. This meant the country was unable to fully capitalise on the high copper prices, which peaked in May, according to economist Yvonne Mhango at Renaissance Capital.

Erasmus predicts that copper prices going forward will see a moderate but sustained decline, amplified by monetary policy normalisation in the US and the risk of a Chinese slowdown driven by stresses in the country’s property sector. These headwinds, Erasmus argues, will ensure that Hichilema will remain “mindful of the urgency to strengthen copper output”.

Major contrasts the Zambian outlook with that in South Africa. He is critical of President Cyril Ramaphosa’s cautious approach. Hichilema has shown a willingness to purge figures associated with the old regime, Major says: “Purging is necessary. But Ramaphosa does not purge. He promotes. South Africa needs a radical change in governance. Zambia is showing South Africa the way.”

Ghana overtook South Africa as the continent’s largest gold producer in 2019. Major sees little chance of that being reversed. Ghana’s government “acknowledges the problems and takes steps to help the industry,” Major says, citing its efforts to keep AngloGold Ashanti in the country.

In 2016, AngloGold’s head of corporate affairs, John Owusu, was killed during a riot by artisanal miners at the company’s Obuasi mine, but AngloGold has stuck with the project. “There is not more gold in Ghana than in South Africa, but there is a better legal framework,” Major says.

Ghana is scored 69 out of 100 in a 2021 ranking from the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NGRI) – an improvement of 13 points since 2017. Governance of taxation has improved, mostly due to the power of the Ghana Revenue Authority to audit all businesses, including mining companies. On adherence to environmental and social impacts, Ghana scored a maximum 100 on the NGRI index, with all gold-­mining companies now disclosing environmental and social impact assessments and environmental mitigation plans for new projects.

Refining for mining

National budgeting governance has improved due to the adoption of, and adherence to, fiscal rules, the NGRI says. Still, the report claims the extractives sector is being held back by a lack of online data portals, and weak adherence to open data standards. The government currently has no policy in place to publicly disclose mining sector contracts, though there are mandatory contract disclosures in the oil and gas sector.

Sulemanu Koney, CEO of the Ghana Chamber of Mines, is confident that Ghana’s mining sector can drive the country’s industrial development. For that, he argues, Ghana needs to move up the value chain and start to refine its raw materials. He wants to end the use of imported rubber for mining components and is in discussions with a multinational company to refine Ghanaian rubber.

“Extractive industries can’t be a silo or an enclave,” says Koney, a chemical engineer by training. “Deliberate thinking is needed to link themes up.” An example, Koney says, is the extraction of caustic soda from brine, which is used by the mining industry as well as in aluminium production and in detergents.

Mozambique’s progress

Ghana, Koney argues, needs a “minerals-based industrialisation strategy”. The challenge, he says, is to “leverage the presence of the mining industry for the good of the country” by promoting training and investment in technology. “That’s my raison d’être. Otherwise I would have given up a long time ago.”

The US is trying desperately not to buy rare earth from China.

In Mozambique, the coming year will be crucial in consolidating progress against the radical Islamic insurgency in the north of the country, which has delayed plans to develop the region’s natural gas resources. Progress in combating the insurgency means that “sentiment has changed quite drastically” for the better in recent months, says Hermano Juvane, head of oil, gas and value-­chain banking at Absa Bank in  Mozambique.

Support for Mozambique’s army, including from Rwanda and the Southern African Development Community, has contributed to the improvement, Juvane says. People have been able to return home to Palma in the northern Cabo  Delgado province.

TotalEnergies in September announced a two-year delay to the first onshore production of liquefied natural gas in Mozambique, with the first output now scheduled for 2026. TotalEnergies declared force majeure at its $15bn project in April, but project activity is now expected to restart in 2022. Juvane sees the new timetable as realistic. “There is about four years of work left,” he says.

Absa in Mozambique is focusing on financing subcontractors of the extractive industries, Juvane says. He sees opportunities for Mozambique in heavy sands, titanium, coal, lithium, graphite, aluminium and rubies.

Extracting the rare earth minerals, a set of 17 metallic elements used for high-tech applications such as cell phones, computer hard drives and electric vehicles, maybe an African industry of the future. China dominates the global supply of rare earths with an estimated share of 85%-90%, but Covid-19 and US-China tensions have sharpened the need for the world to find non-Chinese sources.

A rare-earth opportunity

“The US is trying desperately not to buy rare earth from China,” Simon Gardner-Bond, chief technical officer at Dublin-based TechMet, told a briefing in October. “The whole world is becoming increasingly nervous about China controlling the supply chain.”

TechMet invests in projects to develop critical metals for the transition to renewable energy and counts Rainbow Rare Earths among its investments. Rainbow, which is listed on London’s alternative investment market AIM, holds Africa’s only working rare earths mine at Gakara in Burundi.

But Burundi’s government in April halted production because it wants to renegotiate the mining convention, and meetings between Rainbow CEO George Bennett and President Évariste Ndayishimiye have so far not resolved the issue.

Rainbow is also planning to produce rare earths from gypsum stacks generated by hard-rock phosphate mining near Phalaborwa in South Africa’s Limpopo province and is exploring the economic viability of possible rare-earth deposits in northern Zimbabwe. Bennett is still confident agreement with Burundi can be reached. “There will be some give and take,” he says. “We will come up with a win-win solution.”

 

Source: https://www.theafricareport.com/168452/zambia-has-more-than-copper-and-offers-unexplored-potential/

NOTICE OF BEST EVALUATED BIDDER

Tender for the Provision of Common Leasehold Certificates of Title Deeds for ZCCM-IH Property Assets in Lusaka, Kabwe and Chililabombwe

 

The Bidders named below have been evaluated as the best bidders for the procurement requirements detailed below. In accordance with the requirement of clause 121 of the Public Procurement Regulations, 2011, it is the intention of ZCCM-IH, the procuring entity, to award contracts to the bidders named after ten (10) working days from the display given below.

 

Procurement Reference     Number ZCCM-IH/127/2021
Procurement   Description Provision of Common Leasehold Certificates of Title Deeds for ZCCM-IH Property Assets in Lusaka, Kabwe and Chililabombwe
Method of Procurement

 

Open National Bidding
Name and Address of Best Evaluated Bidder Noel Muleya Investments Limited & Wamuba Construction Limited, 3A Indeco Flats, Jambo Drive, Parklands, P.O. Box 23163, Kitwe
Proposed Contract Prices ZMW 1,489,627.20, Inclusive of VAT and Withholding Tax
Date of Display

 

20th January 2022
Date of      Removal

 

3rd February 2022

The display of this notice does not constitute an award of contract to the selected Bidders.  

Bid acceptance and contract placement shall be in accordance with the Public Procurement Regulations. Bidders have the right to appeal in accordance with the Public Procurement Regulations, 2011 within ten (10) working days from the date of publication of this notice.

 

Read the full document here: Notice of Best Evaluated Bidder – Provision of Common Leasehold Certificates of Title Deeds for ZCCM-IH Property Assets in Lusaka Kabwe and Chililabombwe – Januar (002)

NOTICE OF BEST EVALUATED BIDDER

The Bidder named below has been evaluated as the best evaluated bidder for the procurement requirements detailed below. In accordance with the requirement of clause 121 of the Public Procurement Regulations, 2011, it is the intention of ZCCM Investments Holdings Plc (ZCCM-IH), the procuring entity, to award the contracts to the bidder named after ten (10) working days from the display given below.

 

Table 1.

Procurement Reference     Number ZCCM-IH/016/2021
Procurement Description Design, Print, Supply and Delivery of Various ZCCM-IH Branded Collaterals
Method of Procurement Open National Bidding
Names and Addresses of Best Evaluated Bidders Lot 1& 2. Retro International Zambia Limited, Plot No. 6282 Mapepe Road, Lusaka, Zambia.

Lot 2. Central Clothing Factory Limited, Plot No. 12627, Chinika Industrial Area, P.O. Box 30522, Lusaka Zambia.

Proposed Contract Prices Lot 1- ZMW360,760.00 VAT Inclusive, with a Delivery Period of; Three (03) weeks from Contract Date

Lot 2- ZMW251,975.00 VAT Inclusive, with a Delivery Period of; Three (03) weeks from Contract Date 

Date of Display 20th January 2022
Date of Removal 3rd February 2022

The display of this notice does not constitute an award of contract to the Bidders mentioned above.

Bid acceptance and contract placement shall be in accordance with the Public Procurement Regulations. Bidders have the right to appeal, in accordance with the Public Procurement Regulations, 2011, within ten (10) working days from the date of publication of this notice.

 

Read the full document here: Notice of Best Evaluated Bidder for Design Print Supply and Delivery of Various ZCCM-IH Branded Collaterals (1)

MCM HAS SHOWN POTENTIAL FOR RETURN ON INVESTMENT

THAT Mopani Copper Mines (MCM) produced 87, 618 metric tonnes of copper last year from which it raised US$853 million compared to 2020 when it mined 93,106 tonnes and made US$558 million, is testimony that copper mining will continue being the hen which lays the country’s golden eggs. From the disclosure by MCM chief executive officer Charles Sakanya on Thursday, copper is an asset promising this country huge returns considering the technological advancements in terms of the motor industry and information and communications technology developments. Increasing revenue by 53 percent against a reduced output of six percent points to the viability of the mining sector. Better still, MCM has used these funds prudently in empowering the local economy via settling local debt of US$40 million against a long-standing balance of US$68 million.
Most businesses were initially shunning working with MCM after Glencore left because they all thought it was the end of the mine. MCM has demonstrated the potential for return on investment. It is also a sure sign that mining is still attractive in Zambia and a lot can be done to make extractive industries contribute much more meaningfully to economic development.
The country must position itself to exploit high demand and attractive prices of copper, particularly in view of the automotive industry transitioning to electric vehicles (EVs). Glencore ended its involvement in copper mining in Zambia by agreeing to the sale of its interests in MCM in 2021 for just US$1 to mining company ZCCM Investment Holdings. The transaction was regarded as a reputational damage for Zambia, which lost a blue-chip mining company as an investor in the country.
But MCM’s performance since the departure of Swiss-based Glencore has been outstanding. In 2021, the company exceeded its target of producing 75,000 tonnes of copper and instead excavated 87,618 tonnes of the mineral. By exceeding, MCM has demonstrated that there are enough skill sets among Zambians to run mines efficiently and profitably. The Zambianisation of 48 senior jobs by MCM is not a mean achievement. Expatriates contribute to pressure on the country’s exchange market as they externalise most of their earnings, thereby increasing forex demand and eroding the value of the Zambian Kwacha. Mr Sakanya said this year, MCM needs US$160 million to complete some of its projects, which are key to increasing copper production.
The US$160 million offers local banks to contribute to the success story of MCM, a wholly-owned ZCCM-IH mining firm.
The previous owners, Glencore, were seemingly denying Zambians and the local banking financial system of the much-needed liquidity for investment. Multinationals engage in a lot of transfer pricing and other tax avoidance schemes. The fact that Mopani plans to raise finances for projects from the local banking system also goes to confirm several benefits which will accrue to our financial markets. If so much money can be made available by local banks to syndicate financing at a single mine, banks must be encouraged to also innovatively finance other economic undertakings, especially where competitive advantages exist, in order to diversify the economy from extractive and wasting sectors. The K2 billion Zambia Revenue Authority owes MCM in Value Added Tax (VAT) refunds is a source of worry. Tax reforms should be speeded up to avoid productive companies being out of pocket for extended periods of time and stifling their production and eventually the contributions to economic development Given the favourable copper prices and the Government’s fragile cash-flow situation, it might be an opportunity for capable Zambians to organise a consortium or joint venture and take over the running of the mine. Indeed, Mopani appears to be driving at becoming a success story. All it needs is Government’s support But the US$1.5 billion debt to Glencore has to be reviewed or renegotiated, if legally possible, so that the mine can redirect resources to is operations. The author is editorials editor at the Zambia Daily Mail.

 

Source: http://www.daily-mail.co.zm/mcm-has-shown-potential-for-return-on-investment/

KARIBA MINERALS LTD EXCEEDS EXCEED OUTPUT TARGET

Easing of COVID restrictions sees firm producing 1, 600 tonnes of amethyst

Kariba Minerals Limited (KML) produced 1, 600 tonnes of amethyst last year against a target of 1,200 tonnes following relaxation of coronavirus restrictions in China and India.

The company, which is a subsidiary of ZCCM- Investments Holdings (ZCCM-IH) has been operating for over 60 years, producing over 90% of amethyst in Mapatizya and Sinazongwe in Southern Province.

ZCCM-IH corporate affairs manager, Loisa Mbatha said in a statement of Friday that COVID-19 affected the company’s sales, which fell by 50% in 2020.

“However, by 2021, markets in Asia, in particular China and India, started opening up and the company started exporting in the fourth quarter of 2021 resulting in an increase of production last year,” Ms Mbatha said.

KML recently expanded its value-addition projects to include gemstone cutting and polishing such as cabochon, facets, carvings, beads and gemstone trading.

Ms Mbatha said plans are in the pipeline to open a jewellery retail store and firm has secured an outlet at Kenneth Kaunda International Airport in Lusaka.

KML is also manufacturing amethyst stone tops such as kitchen tops, tabletops, tiles, and tombstones, among others.

It has commenced local sales for low-grade amethyst which has created over 150 jobs.

Ms Mbatha said KML is also creating opportunities by partnering with local mine licence owners to increase production and supply to international markets.

 

 

 

 

BOZ BUYS GOLD WORTH K345M FROM KANSANSHI COPPER MINES

THE Bank of Zambia (BoZ) has procured 282.79 kilogrammes (kg) of gold at a cost of K345.6 million from December 2020. Gold weighing 195.95 kg was bought from Kansanshi Copper Mines at the cost of K241.8 million, while 86.84 kg was purchased from Zambia Gold Company, a subsidiary of ZCCM-IH at the cost of K103.8 million.
This is according to the Ministry of Finance and National Planning in its response to online questions on gold purchasing released recently.

ZCCM-IH SHAREHOLDERS ENDORSE 90% ACQUISITION IN ZAMBIA’S MOPANI

LUSAKA (Reuters) – Shareholders in Zambia’s ZCCM-IH have overwhelmingly supported its acquisition of a 90% stake in Mopani Copper Mines (MCM), the state-owned mining investment firm said on Wednesday.

Glencore agreed the sale of its majority stake in Mopani to ZCCM-IH in a $1.5 billion deal, the miner and trader said in January.

The extraordinary general meeting vote on the resolution was the last condition towards the completion of the transaction and ZCCM-IH now holds 100% ownership of Mopani, ZCCM-IH said in a statement.

The deal is funded by borrowings from Carlisa Investments Corp – a British Virgin Islands-based company through which Glencore holds its stake – and other members of the Glencore group.

With increased ownership, ZCCM-IH would now be an active participant in the global industry as copper becomes a critical metal, ZCCM-IH Chief Executive Mabvuto Chipata said.

“Mopani will repay the remaining debt of $1.5 billion from its own cashflows and the repayment is expected to happen well within the remaining life of mine,” Chipata said.

Glencore said in a separate statement it would continue to retain offtake rights in respect of Mopani’s production.

ZCCM-IH has said it expects to find a new investor for Mopani by the end of the year as it looks to boost copper output from a little more than 34,000 tonnes to 150,000 tonnes.

 

Source: https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-mopani-copper-m-a-zccm-ih-idUSKBN2BN1UZ

NEW ZCCM-IH CHAIR SETS INVESTMENT AGENDA

NEWLY appointed ZCCM- Investment Holding (ZCCM-IH) board chairperson Dolika Banda (left) says she will ensure that the institution’s agenda on investment remains top priority in creating and maximising economic transformation across the mining value chain.
She said this in her new year message to ZCCM-IH shareholders posted by the Lusaka Securities Exchange Commission(LuSE) yesterday.

 

Source: https://www.times.co.zm/?p=114120